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Influenza: Managing the Supply and Distribution of the Influenza Vaccine 
Background and History of Influenza as a Public Health Issue 
Historically, influenza has proven to be a significant challenge to public health 
(Prisco, 2002). Medical historians have documented several major influenza 
pandemics throughout the early modern and modern eras that have served to 
substantially diminish the global population, while also disrupting economic, cultural, 
and social practices (Gensheimer, Fukuda, Brammer, Cox, Strikas & Patriarca, 1999). 
For centuries, the lack of a clear understanding of the nature and mechanism of 
influenza, as well as the absence of effective prevention and treatment methods, 
significantly served to exacerbate the impact of the illness. 
In the twentieth century, as the collective body of medical and scientific 
knowledge expanded, the nature and characteristics of influenza and other related 
viruses began to be explored. However, the rudimentary understanding of the disease 
that had been attained by the early decades of the twentieth century was not sufficient 
to reduce the scope of the massive pandemic that killed millions of people worldwide 
in1918. 
The magnitude and impact of the 1918 pandemic, paired with emerging 
advances in medical and scientific knowledge, understanding, and technology, brought 
the problem of influenza into the burgeoning field of public health. In the context of the 
progressive political environment that had emerged in the early decades of the 
twentieth century, early public policy dictating prevention techniques and allocating 
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federal and state monies for research began to be dedicated to the issue. Paired with 
the rapid advances that were being made in the field of vaccines, these early efforts 
forced the issue of influenza to the forefront of public health and policy (Couch, 1999). 
In the mid-twentieth century, after several decades of intensive research and 
experimentation, the first influenza vaccines were developed and deemed ready for 
widespread public application (Couch, 1999). While the use of the vaccine proved to 
stem the tide of contagion, the ever-evolving nature of the virus proved to be a difficult 
challenge for vaccine developers. Even in the early years of influenza vaccine 
availability, many of the issues that surround the use, supply, and distribution of the 
vaccine today were prevalent, including questions of which segments of the population 
should have access to the vaccine and how the supply should be managed and 
distributed in order to achieve the most effective defense. I 
• 
Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, the standards and practices 
used in the development and distribution of the influenza vaccine were solidified in the 
United States and other Western nations. Several pandemics emerged during this 
period, due in large part to the unexpected spread of previously undetected strains of 
influenza. Still, the increasingly widespread use of the vaccine limited the amount of 
morbidity and mortality associated with influenza, preventing the recurrence of the 
massive loss of life associated with the 1918 pandemic (Couch, 1999). 
Over the course of the last decade, the distribution and prioritization of the 
influenza vaccine has become increasingly standardized, with a high proportion of the 
geriatric population, health care workers, some young children, and other segments of 
the population deemed to be at high risk for infection (Couch, 1999). However, in 
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many jurisdictions, state and municipal oversight has developed and implemented 
guidelines for the supply and distribution of the vaccine. As a result, the methods and 
regulations governing the supply and distribution of the vaccine may differ significantly 
in different states and cities (Gensheimer, Meltzer, Postema & Strikas, 2003). 
Although management of the development, supply, and distribution of the 
influenza vaccine has grown more sophisticated and standardized in recent years, the 
lack of standard procedures between different municipalities, states, and regions has 
prompted some criticism. This censure has grown more pointed in the years in which 
shortages and other disruptions or irregularities in the supply and distribution of the 
vaccine has been interrupted. Some critics have called for stricter government 
oversight and regulation of the development, supply, and distribution of the influenza 
vaccine as a result (Gensheimer, Meltzer, Postema & Strikas, 2003). 
Over the last decade, several shortages and/or supply interruptions have 
caused difficulty in the supply and distribution of the influenza vaccine. However, few 
instances of vaccine shortfalls have received as much media and public attention as 
the shortage that was revealed in the fall of 2004. Despite early problems with supply 
and distribution, most states were able to procure sufficient stocks of the vaccine to 
serve the most vulnerable segments of the population. Indeed, in some states, a 
predicted shortfall eventually turned into a surplus of the vaccine. 
Although no significant public health problem or pandemic has yet been linked 
to the irregularities in the influenza vaccine supply that were brought to light in the fall 
of 2004, the situation has cast light on many shortcomings, loopholes, and deficiencies 
in the current approach to the management and oversight of the development, supply, 
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and distribution of the influenza vaccine. While some critics suggest that the 
heightened media scrutiny directed at the problems surrounding the influenza vaccine 
was artificially magnified by the incorporation of the issue into the then-ongoing 
presidential campaign, many Americans in the general public, as well as public health 
experts, feel that the recent attention that has been paid to the vagaries of the vaccine 
system is justified and necessary. 
In the wake of the 2004 shortage, the current system of influenza vaccine 
development, supply, and distribution has been called into question, as has been the 
management of the process by federal, state, and municipal government agencies. 
There are increasing calls for heightened government scrutiny of the process 
emanating from many quarters, although some conservatives regard the issue as 
evidence that fear of lawsuits has stymied the otherwise natural functionality of the 
free market. At the current juncture, although it remains unclear what the exact policy 
implications of the vaccine shortage will be in the long-term, it is abundantly clear that 
this issue, recently thrust into the public discourse, requires significant remediation. 
Influenza and the Vaccine Supply 
Despite the fact that significant gains have been made in the development, 
supply, and distribution of the influenza vaccine over the course of the last several 
decades, periodic difficulties with shortages and other irregularities demonstrate the 
weaknesses in the current system, which is characterized by a plurality of different, 
and in some instances, contradictory standards set forth by various federal, state, and 
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local jurisdictions. The shortage that was revealed in the fall of 2004 demonstrated the 
fatal problems that continue to render the current approach to vaccine development, 
supply, and distribution vulnerable and untenable in the long-term. 
For a number of reasons, the specter of an unstable, unpredictable influenza 
vaccine supply chain is a variable that must be addressed. In recent years, public 
health experts have repeatedly asserted that neither the United States nor other 
industrialized nations are adequately prepared to deal with the consequences of a 
serious pandemic (Saito & Tashiro, 2000). 
Furthermore, as demonstrated in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks, even a short interruption in the normal function of the American 
economy can create aftershocks that continue to resonate for years, negatively 
impacting not only productivity and labor, but also more intangible factors such as 
standard of living, quality of life, and overall public health (Meltzer & Cox, 1999; Cram, 
Blitz, Manto & Fendrick, 2001 ). As a related issue, the volatile political environment 
that has emerged since the 9/11 attacks has rendered the possibility of an influenza 
pandemic being deliberately initiated by bioterrorists, once believed to be a highly 
unlikely scenario, a much more credible threat. Taken together, all of these 
considerations underscore the significance of the current lack of a cohesive, unified 
body of public policy regarding the development, supply, and distribution of the 
influenza vaccine. 
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Influenza: Pandemics and the Future Outlook 
According to leading epidemiologists and public health experts who have 
studied the dissemination and evolution of the influenza virus, the emergence of a 
worldwide influenza pandemic is inevitable. Many of these same experts have 
asserted that both the industrialized world and developing nations are ill-prepared to 
meet the challenges a pandemic will bring (Fedson, Gellin & Modlin, 2003). 
Although the prospect of creating a comprehensive pandemic preparedness 
plan presents many formidable challenges, the shortcomings and deficiencies that 
were revealed to be inherent in the United States' current approach to the 
development, supply, and distribution of the influenza vaccine is an important starting 
point. Furthermore, many public health experts have agreed that a comprehensive 
policy addressing the development, supply, and distribution of the influenza vaccine 
could help avoid shortages in the future (Fedson, Gellin & Modlin, 2003). 
Influenza: Characteristics, Prevalence, and Impact upon Public Health 
Although variations of the influenza virus have been active for centuries, current 
patterns of the illness continue to evolve in many ways, some of which are predictable 
and others that are not. Currently, in the United States, an estimated 15% of the 
population contracts the influenza virus in any given year (Harper, Fukuda, Uyeki, Cox 
& Bridges, 2004 ). However, of these millions of individuals, the strength and intensity 
of the virus can vary significantly. Some may experience little or no outward 
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symptoms, while others may develop severe complications, such as pneumonia, which 
can be fatal (Harper, Fukuda, Uyeki, Cox & Bridges, 2004). 
Current estimates hold that between 30,000 and 40,000 deaths in the United 
States are caused annually either indirectly or directly by influenza. Recent figures 
show that an average of over 200,000 hospitalizations occur annually as a direct or 
indirect result of influenza (Wood, Nguyen & Schmidt, 2000). 
While influenza itself can be fatal, the far more prevalent risk is that the illness 
will cause complications or exacerbate extant problems in individuals weakened by 
other health conditions (Harper, Fukuda, Uyeki, Cox & Bridges, 2004 ). This is why the 
geriatric population is often regarded as being at the greatest risk from influenza, as 
well as the frequent classification of the elderly as a vulnerable population that merits 
top priority for dispensation of the influenza vaccine (Couch, 1999). 
Another group at significant risk of developing complications associated with 
influenza consists of individuals of any age with chronic health problems or ongoing 
medical conditions. Of specific concern are individuals whose pre-existing medical 
problems or treatment regimens have caused vulnerabilities in the immune system 
(Saito & Tashiro, 2000). In addition, infants and very young children have a high risk of 
developing complications with influenza due in part to their immature respiratory 
systems (Harper, Fukuda, Uyeki, Cox & Bridges, 2004). 
Any individual whose occupation or living situation necessitates frequent 
contact with others who may be carrying the influenza virus is also typically considered 
to be at heightened risk of contracting the illness. This group typically includes health 
care workers, infants and young children who attend preschool or daycare, and, to a 
1 
Influenza 9 r-[ 
lesser extent, any individual who comes into contact with the public on a frequent 
basis (Couch, 1999). 
In the United States and the rest of the Northern Hemisphere, the winter 
months comprise the height of influenza season (Harper, Fukuda, Uyeki, Cox & 
Bridges, 2004 ). In recent years, the month of February has seen the highest influenza 
activity. One of the most dangerous aspects of influenza is the ease of transmitting the 
illness. Described by epidemiologists as "droplet spread," influenza can be transmitted 
between individuals within a virus-contaminated droplet of liquid (Meltzer & Cox, 
1999). 
The propulsion provided by a sneeze or a cough provides the movement 
needed to carry the influenza virus into a new host body. Though thought to be a less 
frequent mode of transmission, recent research has indicated that the influenza virus 
can also be contracted by coming into contact with an infected droplet on a surface 
and then touching one's own mucous membranes (Meltzer & Cox, 1999). 
The mechanism of the influenza virus as it enters the human body and begins 
to replicate itself is complex, and has only recently come to be more fully understood. 
The complexity and stealth of the influenza virus is one of the reasons why it takes the 
average human immune system one to two weeks to begin to mount an effective 
defense against the invading virus, which represents the average length of time that 
most cases of influenza incapacitate an infected individual (Harper, Fukuda, Uyeki, 
Cox & Bridges, 2004 ). It is this complexity that also renders the development of an 
effective influenza vaccine such a difficult and potentially delicate process (Saito & 
Tashiro, 2000). 
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The Efficacy of the Influenza Vaccine 
The influenza vaccine works by exposing the immune system to a weakened 
form of the multiple strains of the virus (Lee, 2003). Each dose of the influenza vaccine 
contains several types of the virus, albeit in an inactive form that can be easily 
overtaken by the body's immune system (Couch, 1999). As with all vaccines, this 
process stimulates the body's resistance to these strains of the virus. Therefore, if the 
vaccinated individual comes into contact with droplets that contain any of the strains 
that have been used in the vaccine, the immune system can rapidly overtake the virus 
without allowing the full illness to develop (Lee, 2003). 
Generally, individuals who have received the influenza vaccine have protection 
from the virus beginning two weeks after the administration of the vaccination. 
Furthermore, the vaccine is effective for a year, barring the widespread introduction of 
a strain of influenza that was not included in the year's vaccination (Harper, Fukuda, 
Uyeki, Cox & Bridges, 2004). 
Each year, medical researchers and representatives of the World Health 
Organization recommend the strains of influenza that should be included in the year's 
vaccine. This determination is made based on the strains of influenza that appear to 
be the most resilient, intense, and widespread at the juncture when the development 
of the vaccine must be initiated in order to attain an adequate supply before the next 
influenza season begins. 
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For the majority of individuals who receive an influenza vaccination, the 
chances of developing a full-blown case of influenza over the course of the next year 
are diminished by 70% to 90%. For those who are in ill health or who are otherwise 
immuno-compromised, the vaccine's success rate falls to 30% to 40% (Harper, 
Fukuda, Uyeki, Cox & Bridges, 2004 ). However, studies have demonstrated that the 
vaccine is successful in preventing the intensity and severity of influenza cases across 
the full spectrum of individuals who receive it (Harper, Fukuda, Uyeki, Cox & Bridges, 
2004). 
One important indicator of the vaccine's success is the decline in hospitalization 
from influenza or common influenza complications, such as pneumonia, among 
individuals who have been vaccinated against the virus (Harper, Fukuda, Uyeki, Cox & 
Bridges, 2004). Furthermore, it is estimated that the morbidity and mortality associated 
with influenza and influenza complications are significantly reduced among those who 
have received an influenza vaccine. 
The Production of the Influenza Vaccine 
After the determination has been made as to which influenza strains will be 
included in the year's vaccine formulation, the correct proportion of viral stock is 
delivered the manufacturers of the vaccine. The process of influenza vaccine 
production is complex and relatively vulnerable to disruption or damage. Indeed, the 
vaccine production firm that failed to deliver the promised quantity of vaccine doses for 
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the 2004-2005 influenza season cited irregularities in the production process as one of 
the primary reasons behind the failure. 
The most common process of developing the influenza vaccine involves 
introducing the viral stock into fertilized chicken eggs, with each individual strain of the 
virus grown in separate batches. Once the virus has been introduced into the chicken 
egg, it begins its reproductive process. Once this process has created a viable sample 
of each strain of the virus, the allantoic fluid that contains the influenza is harvested 
from the eggs (Couch, 1999). 
The next phase in the production process involves inactivating the virus and 
purifying it, so that it is suitable for the weakened form that is required in the vaccine 
process. The next phase involves combining the various strains of influenza that have 
I been developed into a single-dose formulation, and the last phase of the production 
' 
process is the dispensation of the doses into the single-use vials that are used to 
administer the vaccine (Harper, Fukuda, Uyeki, Cox & Bridges, 2004). In a year in 
which the production process has been completed with no significant delays or 
problems, the completed influenza vaccine supplies are delivered to supply centers 
and health care facilities in September and October. 
Currently, there are few viable alternatives to this complex and potentially 
delicate vaccine development process. The most promising alternative to emerge is a 
type of vaccine that uses a weakened, but live form of the virus and is administered 
through a nasal spray (Couch, 1999). This form of the vaccine was available in limited 
quantities in the 2004-2005 influenza season, but long-term determinations of its 
efficacy have not yet been made. 
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A significant amount of research attention has been focused upon the 
development of alternative methods of delivery and production of the influenza 
vaccine. There are several potential innovations that may be introduced in the near 
future, but because of the scale and scope of the public health variables involved, 
certification of a new approach to vaccine production and/or administration involves a 
lengthy, multi-tiered administrative process (Kandel & Hartshorn, 2001). As such, 
many public health experts have asserted that changes and reforms need to be 
implemented that effectively address the shortcomings and deficiencies in the current 
process of influenza vaccine production (Harper, Fukuda, Uyeki, Cox & Bridges, 
2004). 
Examining the 2004-2005 Influenza Vaccine Shortage and Its Systemic Implications 
Over the course of the last several years, the emergence of several previously-
undocumented, particularly virulent strains of influenza have heightened anxiety about 
the efficacy of the traditional formulation of the vaccine to combat newly evolved types 
of the virus (Kandel & Hartshorn, 2001 ). However, in the 2004-2005 influenza season, 
it proved to be anomalies and deficiencies in the vaccine production, supply, and 
distribution process that caused a significant problem. 
In October 2004, vaccine manufacturer Chi ron alerted federal government 
officials that the supplies being readied in the company's UK manufacturing facilities 
would not be delivered as a result of a widespread bacterial contamination that was 
thought to have rendered most of the supply unusable (Krisberg, 2005). The Liverpool 
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plant in which a majority of the vaccines were being prepared had had its certification 
revoked by the government regulatory agency, an action that was deemed appropriate 
by the FDA's subsequent investigation of the matter. 
Chi ron had promised to deliver approximately half of the annual national supply 
of influenza vaccine. Because Chi ron was one of only two vaccine manufacturers that 
were charged with the task of developing 2004-2005 influenza vaccines for the United 
States, the remaining suppliers were able to promise 54 million doses of the traditional 
vaccine and approximately 1 million doses of the nasal-spray formulation (Krisberg, 
2005). Taken together, the supply that was thought to be available at that juncture fell 
far short of the estimated 80 million doses that were thought to be needed to meet 
demand. 
After the initial announcement of an expected shortfall, the initial response that 
was marshaled by both the government and the medical/public health community was 
the issuance of guidelines determining which segments of the population should be 
granted priority to receive the influenza vaccine (Krisberg, 2005). For the most part, 
the initial guidelines that were issued overlapped with the typical recommendations for 
who should receive the vaccine. However, in addition, those in good health, without 
any substantial risk factors, were advised to delay or cancel their annual influenza 
vaccination. 
The second phase of response to the shortage announcement was an attempt 
to replace the vaccine shortfall with doses procured from other sources. In this 
endeavor, there was very little coordination, as representatives from various federal, 
state, municipal governments, as well as an array of non-governmental organizations, 
Influenza 15 
sought to procure additional doses of influenza vaccine (Krisberg, 2005). While some 
of these procurement efforts were met with success, the relative dearth of worldwide 
suppliers of the vaccine resulted in very little surplus materials being available. 
Although the possibility for widespread influenza outbreaks still exists at the 
current moment, as the typical influenza season runs through March, it appears that 
the shortage had little overall impact on the public health. Indeed, in many locales, 
officials were ultimately left with surplus stores of the 2004-2005 vaccine (Krisberg, 
2005). It has been suggested that the initial announcement of temporarily more 
stringent guidelines for determining who should receive the vaccine prompted a 
significant decline in demand during this influenza season. 
Factors that Contributed to the Shortage 
It is clear that the direct cause of the initial shortage of the 2004-2005 influenza 
vaccine that was announced in October 2004 was the reliance on only two 
manufacturers for the development of the United States' entire vaccine supply. If the 
manufacturing process had been dispersed throughout a broader field of companies, 
representing a wide array of production facilities, it is highly unlikely that production 
problems within a single manufacturing site could have resulted in such a substantial 
loss for the nation's vaccine supply as a whole (Krisberg, 2005). 
However, to state that the dearth of manufacturers responsible for developing 
the nation's influenza supply is the sole cause of the shortage that occurred in October 
2004 would be an oversimplification of the situation. In actuality, numerous 
Influenza 16 
contributing factors and variables culminated in not only the lack of adequate supply of 
the influenza vaccine, but also in the over reliance on two pharmaceutical 
manufacturers as the sole suppliers of a preventative treatment that is vitally important 
for the maintenance of public health in the United States. 
Although the CDC, FDA, and other agencies of the federal government 
participate in plans for the development, supply, and distribution of the influenza 
vaccine on an annual basis, there exists no overarching government body charged 
with closely managing the process from both an epidemiological and a logistical 
standpoint. Private manufacturers and suppliers contract to meet the projected needs 
set forth by epidemiologists and public health experts, but there are no unambiguous 
government directives or incentives that compel participation in the manufacturing 
process. To the contrary, many industry analysts assert that the federal government's 
bargaining power has actually driven down the market price for influenza vaccine, 
further eliminating the potential for a competitive field of vaccine manufacturers 
seeking to enter the market (Krisberg, 2005). 
There is little certainty of profitable revenues in the production and 
manufacturing of the influenza vaccine. The current manufacturing process is 
complex, delicate, and susceptible to problems such as contamination. Furthermore, 
the wholesale prices that can be garnered for each dose rarely exceed a few dollars 
each, meaning that manufacturing costs often come close to the sale price of each 
dose (Fedson, Gellin & Modlin, 2003). 
The unstable nature of the vaccine market presents another disincentive for 
potential manufacturers and suppliers. Because the strength and intensity of the 
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influenza season are variables that are often unpredictable, manufacturers are often 
saddled with millions of surplus vaccines that they must buy back if unused. Because 
the nature of the influenza vaccine process requires a new formulation for each annual 
influenza season, the manufacturing costs for these surplus doses often cannot be 
recouped, resulting in further loss of profit (Fedson, Gellin & Modlin, 2003). 
A controversial claim that has been made about the lack of interest in influenza 
vaccine development among private sector pharmaceutical manufacturers is that the 
fear of being faced with a lawsuit has served to further eliminate potential competitors. 
According to this argument, because of the high rates of morbidity and mortality 
associated with the contraction of influenza, the risk of being sued by a patient or a 
patient's family for whom the vaccine did not prevent infection or complications is too 
high to allow for any profit margin or return-on-investment from entering the 
manufacturing market (Krisberg, 2005). 
However, while there is risk involved in the manufacture of any pharmaceutical 
product, there is a lack of clear evidence supporting this claim, considering that fewer 
than ten such malpractice cases have been tried over the course of the last several 
decades. In addition, because the issue of medical malpractice suits has become a 
frequent political topic for the current administration, this argument may be based 
more in the ideology of the current conservative movement, rather than the prevailing 
conditions of the nation's health care sector. 
Taking all of these considerations together, it is clear that the current process of 
manufacturing the influenza vaccine often represents an unprofitable, uncertain 
business venture for manufacturers (Fedson, Gellin & Modlin, 2003). However, 
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currently, the nation's primary method of responding to the inevitable annual influenza 
season is dependant upon the willingness of private-sector pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to commit to a complex, uncertain undertaking that is only occasionally 
profitable. Acknowledging the beliefs about the self-regulating powers of the free 
market that are prevalent within the current administration, this type of reliance upon 
the private sector to engage in a financially detrimental business endeavor seems 
extremely ill-advised. 
At the core of the problem are two competing philosophies of economics, public 
health, and the autonomy of the free market. In the current political climate, the 
traditional conservative beliefs in the free market and its ability to regulate and 
modulate itself prevails. 
At the same time, those on the conservative end of the spectrum typically tend 
to discourage the development of programs or regulatory oversight responsibilities that 
would result in an expansion of the scope and power of the centralized federal 
government. Because both the executive and the legislative branches of federal 
government are currently dominated by conservative Republicans, the current trend 
towards supporting deregulation, minimizing government oversight, and the free reign 
of the market is explainable. 
On the other side of the debate are Democrats, liberals, and progressives, who 
regard the protection and strengthening of the public good as a higher objective than 
ensuring that the forces of the market are allowed to function freely. As such, those on 
this side of the debate regard government oversight, and even subsidy, of the 
development, production, supply, and distribution of the influenza vaccine as a wise 
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investment, considering the loss of productivity, spiraling health care costs, and 
potential loss of life that are associated with influenza and its complications on an 
annual basis (Cram, Blitz, Manto & Fendrick, 2001 ). 
Recommendations for Reforming the Current System of Influenza Vaccine Production 
To a large degree, the point of view that increased government oversight and 
participation in the development and distribution of the influenza vaccine supply is 
necessary is echoed by many in public health and health care policy. Because many 
leading epidemiologists have long warned that a world-wide pandemic is an inevitable 
occurrence, the current lack of preparedness for such an eventuality has prompted 
many experts in public health and health policy to call for reform of the current system 
for many years (Snacken, Kendal, Haaheim & Wood, 1999; Fedson, Gellin & Modlin, 
2003). 
This urgency has increased exponentially since the eme'rgence of particularly 
virulent strains of influenza, including avian flu, over the course of the last several 
years (Lazzari & Stohr, 2004; Trampuz, Prabhu, Smith & Baddour, 2004). Because of 
low human resistance to avian flu, a pandemic outbreak could kill between 2 and 7 
million, according to recent estimates (Fedson, Gellin & Modlin, 2003; Trampuz, 
Prabhu, Smith & Baddour, 2004). 
In addition, the increased possibility of bioterrorism attack involving a virulent 
strain of influenza has also prompted many to call for the development of a more 
comprehensive, unified approach to the problem that includes more government 
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participation and the development of financial or other incentives for manufacturers 
who agree to assist in the development of influenza vaccine in the future (Fedson, 
Gellin & Modlin, 2003). 
Another reform that could increase the profitability of the manufacture of 
influenza vaccine is initiating federal legislation that would mandate full coverage of 
the vaccine for individuals in all at-risk categories in all public and private health 
insurance plans. This would create a more stable market for the influenza vaccine by 
expanding the demand for the drug. 
Profitability incentives for manufacturers of influenza vaccines is perhaps the 
best solution to the urgent problem facing government in deciding the direction of 
vaccine distribution. Free market distribution does need an incentive due to the fickle 
nature of the flu vaccine business and the low profit margin of conventional vaccine 
production. Placing manufacturing and distribution channeling in the hands of the 
government has proved unsuccessful in the past when various other vaccination 
threats faced the nation. For example, the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
included the Vaccines for Children program, which drove up the cost of vaccines in the 
private sector prohibitively for immunization and created polarization between the 
government and the vaccine industry over cost containment (Pollock, 1994 ). Another 
program failure was the National Vaccine Plan, instituted to operate in conjunction with 
the CDC in an attempt to solve the social problem of vaccine distribution. While good 
intentioned, the program never materialized. Thus, keeping vaccination in the hands of 
the private sector while offering incentives to manufacturers works better in the overall 
scheme of pubic health services and within the government's capabilities. 
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Since the government does not have control over a vaccine production facility, 
contracting with an outside vendor to ensure a certain level of production a year is the 
only feasible way to present vaccines to the public. In order to insure that pricing 
remained consistent and a guaranteed amount of vaccine would be produced each 
year, a fixed price plus or a cost plus contract would have to be offered. The parallel of 
this type of contracting in government is similar to defense contracting, a poor model 
for success over the years. This model is not practical due to the complex structure of 
the vaccine industry, with multi-tiered levels of pricing and service dependent upon the 
distribution to the public, private firms or governmental agencies. As the Vaccines for 
Children's program illustrated, the government could very well pay 50 to 80 percent 
more for vaccines, transferring this cost to an already beleaguered healthcare budget 
(Russell, 1996). 
A number of recently proposed legislative measures begin the process of 
creating a federal infrastructure for more scrutiny and oversight of the development of 
the influenza vaccine and management of the vaccine supply. In addition, other 
recently proposed measures will seek to significantly expand the funding available for 
government-subsidized research into influenza and the development of viable 
alternatives to the current method of developing and administering the influenza 
vaccine, including the development of a more broadly effective vaccine formulation 
that could combat multiple strains of the virus simultaneously, or be used in a 
pandemic situation (Kandel & Hartshorn, 2001; Fedson, Gellin & Modlin, 2003). 
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Conclusion 
It remains unclear whether the 2004-2005 influenza vaccine shortage will exert 
a significant impact upon the public health. However, the shortage has brought to light 
the many shortcomings and deficiencies of the current system of vaccine 
development, production, supply, and distribution. Rather than continue to rely on the 
forces of the free market to meet needs crucial to maintaining the public health, 
increased government participation, scrutiny, and oversight of the process is needed 
to remedy this dangerous situation. 
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